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COMMENTS
SUMMARY JURISDICTION OF THE CHAPTER X COURT IN
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
ARTHUR H. FRIBOURGt
An interesting fusion of two long-developing lines of legal thought is ex-
pressed in the recent decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Matter of International Power Securities Corporation,' a debtor in
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. It is first an extension
of the doctrine of unification of control by a single court over the property
and affairs of a debtor under its protection, and, second, an assertion'of the
great'breadth of the court's jurisdiction over all matters prerequisite to the
debtor's reorganization.
The debtor, International Power Securities Corporation, has as its principal
assets certain mortgages on power plants in Italy owned by Societa Edison of
Milan, an Italian corporation. These mortgages formed the collateral behind
the debtor's own publicly-held bond issues. By the terms of the mortgages
Societa Edison was permitted to pay off its obligations to the debtor corpora-
tion by turning in the debtor's bonds, in lieu of cash, for amortization payments,
and bond interest coupons, in lieu. of cash, for its own interest payments. In
1940 Societa Edison failed to pay the interest on its mortgages, and as a result
the debtor was forced to default on the interest payments on its bonds. Amor-
tization of Societa Edison's mortgages and of the debtor's bonds has likewise
ceased.
The two blocks of bonds which were the subject of the order appealed from
totalled almost one-third of the debtor's outstanding obligations. One block,
$3,929,000 in face amount, was concededly owned by Societa Edison and was
held in Italy. The other, $1,250,000 in face amount, was held at the National
City Bank of New York, ostensibly for account of the Banco di Roma of Lugano,
Switzerland. Upon the petition of the disinterested trustee, who claimed that the
latter block of bonds was in fact owned by Societa Edison and that, therefore,
rights of set-off or counterclaim existed as long as the bonds were so owned, the
District Court for New Jersey issued a temporary injunction restraining the
two banks and Societa Edison from selling or otherwise disposing of them.
All three appeared specially to contest the court's jurisdiction. None of them
had appeared in the proceeding or done business within the District of New
Jersey. Notice of the trustee's application was served on Societa Edison and the
National City Bank outside the district and on the Swiss bank by mail. The
court continued the temporary injunction until a later hearing at which proofs
were submitted as to the ownership of the $1,250,000 of bonds. At that hearing
the banks renewed their jurisdictional objections, pointing out (1) that both
the bonds and the banks were outside the normal territorial jurisdiction of the
court, and (2) the summary extraterritorial jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. 170 F. 2d 399 (C. A. 3d 1948).
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court under Chapter X did not apply here because this type of jurisdiction
could be used only to protect the debtor's assets, whereas the bonds in question
were the debtor's liability. The court did not specifically rule on the jurisdic-
tional question. The proofs showed that one Valerio, general manager of
Societa Edison, retained an agent in this country to purchase the bonds, that
Valerio specifically approved in advance the purchase of at least $1,048,000 of
the $1,250,000 and that he supplied the funds to finance the acquisitions. When
Valerio found difficulty in transmitting funds from Italy, his agent borrowed
money from the National City Bank for that purpose, informing the bank that
the loan was to finance the purchase of the bonds for Societa Edison. Despite
these facts, the District Court was unconvinced that Societa Edison owned the
bonds, but it lifted the restraint against the banks while continuing it against
Societa Edison, on the theory that if Edison were in fact the owner, the restraint
against it would adequately protect the debtor's estate.
The Court of Appeals held that not only did the District Court have the right
to enjoin the banks and Societa Edison from selling the bonds but that the
lifting of the injunction as to the banks was reversible error since in view of
what it called Societa Edison's "hidden ball play" the continuance of the in-
junction against Societa Edison alone was inadequate to meet the needs of the
situation.
The decision rests mainly on the extraterritorial power of the reorganization
court, as a court of bankruptcy,2 to protect the debtor's property. It specifically
holds that the right of equitable set-off here asserted by the trustee is property
which the court could protect, though it points out the necessity of drawing a
sharp distinction between the protection of choses in action and their enforce-
ment. Yet the decision can be considered from another point of view as well.
It is a development of the law of reorganization as distinct from the law per-
taining to the bankruptcy powers. Since Chapter X traces its history from
equity receiverships, via the former Section 77B, there is a merger of the
equity receivership and bankruptcy concepts resulting in the fullest powers of
both being concentrated in the reorganization court. Let us look at such a court
from both viewpoints.
Tracing first the scope of that court's bankruptcy powers, we may note first
that it has broad statutory authority to make orders, issue process and enter
judgments so as to carry out the purposes of the Act.3 Its control comprehends
all property of the debtor in the court's actual or constructive possession, where-
ever located.4 And its administration of the estate can be carried on within
its own four walls without the cumbersome ancillary procedures necessary in
equity receiverships.6 The extreme limit of a bankruptcy court's summary
2. Under Chapter X, reorganization courts have substantially the same jurisdiction and
powers, both before and after the approval of a petition, as an ordinary bankruptcy court
has before and after adjudication, 52 STAT. 884 (1938) 11 U. S. C. §§ 512, 514 (1940).
3. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 11 (a-15) (1940).
4. The language of former § 77B giving the court exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor
and its property wherever located was incorporated into Chapter X. 52 STAT. 884 (1938),
11 U. S. C. § 511 (1940).
5. One of the main objectives of § 77B was to obviate the need for ancillary receiver.
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jurisdiction, before the passage of Section 77B and Chapter X, was generally
stated to be about as follows: that it could not adjudicate a controversy about
property held adversely to the bankrupt estate under a substantial claim of
right, unless the adverse claimant consented.0 That rule was not literally true
even in straight bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee was, and is, vested with
property which the bankrupt had fraudulently conveyed or preferentially
transferred," whatever the actual good faith of the transferee and despite the
fact that in either case the bankrupt has always parted with his interest in
the property.
Today, the power of the bankruptcy court over property of the estate is
liberally used by reorganization courts for the collection and distribution of
the assets of the debtor. This power is indulged in even to the extent of enjoin-
ing activities which might adversely affect the debtor's property. Thus, in
Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.,O it
was held proper for the court in a summary proceeding to enjoin the sale of
collateral held by certain note holders. There, too, technical objections were
raised as to jurisdiction. It was claimed that there was no in personam juris-
diction, that there was no jurisdiction over the property whose sale was re-
strained, and that such an injunction could not be granted in a summary pro-
ceeding. The Supreme Court waved aside these objections, holding that the
debtor's equity of redemption in the collateral was a property interest over
which the court was given exclusive jurdisiction, that the court must have the
power to preserve and safeguard such property, and that to that end it can
have process served upon the persons to be enjoined wherever they can be
found within fle United States.10 Not only can it summarily enjoin the sale
ships. H. R. REP. No. 194, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1934). Chapter X also was intended to
centralize power in one court. In i-e Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. 2d 734 (C. C. A. 2d
1935), cert. denied sub nor. Troutman v. Compton, 294 U. S. 725 (1935).
6. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U. S. 191, 193 (1926); Jaquith v. Rowley, 188 U. S. 620,
625, 626 (1903). In some cases fears are expressed as to the possible results of the extension
of the summary jurisdiction beyond traditional bounds. "Neither exclusive jurisdiction of
the debtor nor power to issue process outside the district confers upon the bankruptcy
court the power, in a summary proceeding, to decide, without the consent of an adverse
claimant, a controversy concerning property in his possession, unless his claim be merely
colorable. Were it otherwise, every bona fide possessor of property held adversely to a bank-
rupt could be haled into a distant Federal Court to defend his right to the property
whenever the trustee in a reorganization proceeding should choose to corral him sum-
marily." In re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of America, Inc., 122 F. 2d 232, 239 (C. C. A. 6th
1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 701 (1942).
7. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 879 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 110 (a-4) (1940).
8. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (b) (1940).
9. 294 U. S. 648 (1935). This was a railroad reorganization case under § 77 (53 STAT.
1406 (1939), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (1940)). The exclusive jurisdiction of the court over the
debtor's property under this section is given in the same language as that of § 77B and
Chapter X.
10. Id. at 683.
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of such property but it can summarily retake possession of it." And a
pledgee creditor who ,refuses to file a claim does not thereby evade the jurisdic-
tion of the Court. This was decided in In re Cuyahoga Finance Co.,'2 where
the court summarily determined the amount of the debtor's set-off against a
pledgee who neither filed a claim or otherwise appeared in the case. The court
held that it had jurisdiction of all of the debtor's tangible and intangible assets
whether or not in its possession, and that as a Chaper X court it was "clothed
with authority and charged with the duty to proceed to consummation of a plan
or reorganization in a summary way." 13 The asset here involved-that is, the
equity of redemption in the pledged property-was of a kind over which an
ordinary bankruptcy court would not have had summary jurisdiction. 14 But
the jurisdiction of the Chapter X court was viewed as an extension of bank-
ruptcy powers and as a unification of these powers with the traditional authority
of equity courts to administer the necessary relief in a single action.
The idea of the protection of the debtor's property is seen in another form
in In re Standard Gas & Electric Co.'5 There the trustee had brought suit in
a state court against former directors, and the stockholders sought to intervene
in that action. The federal court enjoined them from so doing, holding that the
chose in action-the suit against the directors--was an asset of the debtor and
that the court could restrain the stockholders from interfering with it. One
might suppose that the idea of "protection of the debtor's property" is stretched
to the uttermost by the inclusion in it of so intangible an asset. But surely
the bursting point is reached when such a suit is considered property of the
debtor whether or not the debtor has an equity in the result Yet in another
case the court reached that conclusion by means of the same old theory.10
None of this rationale can be applied to In re Burton Coal Co.17 There the
court took summary jurisdiction of a dispute between parties concerning which
neither the debtor nor its trustee had any interest. The claim of a creditor was
secured by stock of the company being reorganized. When others claimed
to own the stock, the creditor applied to the reorganization court for an order
establishing his right to it. The appellate court recognized that as the amount
of the creditor's claim depended on his ownership of the stock there could be
no reorganization until the question was decided, and a summary proceeding
before the Chapter X court, rather than a plenary suit outside it, was held to
be the proper way of settling it. This decision is no mere extension of bank-
ruptcy powers to protect the debtor's property. No property of the debtor
11. Grand Boulevard Inv. Co. v. Strauss, 78 F. 2d 180 (C. C. A. 8th 1935).
12. 136 F. 2d 18 (C. C. A. 6th 1943).
13. Id. at 21.
14. May v. Henderson, 268 U. S. 111 (1925).
15. 139 F. 2d 149 (C. C. A. 3d 1943).
16. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. President & Directors of the Manhattan Co.,
105 F. 2d 130 (C. C. A. 2d 1939). The right of bondholders to compel restitution by mort-
gage trustees, who had allegedly wrongfully allowed substitution of collateral, was held to
be property of the debtor, whether or not an equity 'in the collateral still remained after
satisfaction of the bondholders' claims.
17. 126 F. 2d 447 (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
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is being protected. What is being protected is the authority of the reorganiza-
tion court over all activities leading to a fair and feasible plan.
It is as a development of the law of corporate reorganization that the case
can best be understood. It is, in a new form, the familiar equity doctrine that
when equity acquires jurisdiction it will decide all matters incidental to the
main objective of the case.j8 In Chapter X, a fair and feasible plan is always
the main objective.19 If it is impracticable to reorganize the debtor on fair
and feasible lines, the Chapter X proceeding may be dismissed or the debtor
thrown into bankruptcy.20 Looked at with the objectives of reorganization
courts in mind, the results of many of the cases become acceptable without re-
sort to the bankruptcy power. The foregoing discussions of the Continental
Illinois and the Cuyahoga Finance cases show that the courts recognized this,
though they preferred to ground their reasoning mainly on the bankruptcy
power.21 Aside from that power a reorganization court may proceed towards its
objective, a plan, settling incidental matters on the way. Such matters as
whether or not a debtor has an equity in specific pledged property become
unimportant in deciding whether or not that property comes under the juris-
diction of the court. 22
The International Power Securities case is, as previously indicated, a merger
of two ideas. The opinion is based mainly on the extension-of-bankruptcy-
powers idea. The right of set-off is held to be property and the court so justifies
the injunction. Yet a more tenuous type of property can hardly be imagined.
There is no equity of redemption to be protected. The trustee has asserted
18. Allowances are included among such incidental matters. It is not necess ary that
the allowances be payable out of the estate for the court to have jurisdiction over them.
Section 221 (4) of the Bankruptcy Act (52 STAT. 897 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 621 (4) (1940))
gives the court jurisdiction over allowances "for services and for costs and e.pen-es in, or
in connection with, the proceeding or in connection with the plan and incident to the re-
organization .... " Leiman v. Guttman, 69 Sup. Ct. 371 (1949).
19. The same is true in railroad reorganizations under § 77. An injunction was Lssued
during the course of the reorganization of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
to restrain a bank from selling securities pledged with it by the debtor as collateral, a
situation similar to that in the Continental Illinois case. The injunction was later dissolved
on the ground that such dissolution would no longer hinder or obstruct reorganization.
In re New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 102 F. 2d 923, 925 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).
20. 52 STAT. 899 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 636 (1940). Whether or not the debtor is solvent
is not decisive on the question of the appropriateness of straight bankruptcy under such
circumstances. In re Dollar Dry Cleaning Co., 33 F. Supp. 861 (D. C. Conn. 1940).
21. In In re United States Realty & Improvement Co., 153 F. 2d 853 (C. C. A. 2d
1946) the court restrained a pledgee in possession of securities issued by the debtor from
enforcing his pledge pending an exploration of efforts to work out a plan. But where the
sale of bonds of a debtor held by a pledgee would not affect the debtor's reorganization the
court has no power to restrain the sale. In re Hotel Martin Co. of Utica, 94 F. 2d 643
(C. C. A. 2d 1938).
22. It is of course not unusual to reorganize a corporation even though there is no
equity for stockholders. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939); In re 620




no cause of action which he could translate into a lawsuit. There is no property
to which his rights attach, except while the bonds are in the hands of Societa
Edison, or which could conceivably become an asset of the estate. Is such an
inchoate chose in action property? On this ground the decision may be
questioned. Yet on another theory it is a sound result. The sale of the bonds
by Societa Edison to an innocent purchaser for value might have wiped out
the possibility of a set-off, thus increasing the liabilities to which the estate
would be subject. To avoid such a result the court can restrain such an act.
Perhaps a more serious objection than the fact that no property is being pro-
tected is the question of how the injunction can be made effective, and what
sanctions, if any, are available if it is disregarded. "The foundation of juris-
diction is physical power."' as The court here has no physical power over the
Italian company or the Swiss bank. It can, by virtue of its extraterritorial
bankruptcy powers, reach the National City Bank, but that bank is a mere
custodian. It can be prevented from making a book transfer or a physical
delivery of the bonds, but is that effective in preventing a new owner from
being an innocent purchaser for value? Possibly it is. A buyer from Societa
Edison could rescind when he found himself unable to get delivery, and his
failure to rescind after being thus put on inquiry might leave him standing in
the shoes of the seller. The court's opinion does not consider any of these possi-
bilities, nor does it indicate whether a different result would have been reached
had the bonds, too, been outside the country. The limitations of the powers of
Congress and the courts under the bankruptcy clause24 have never been exactly
defined, but clearly those powers are growing and developing in response to
economic needs. To bend jurisdictional questions to the requirements of public
policy as to fair and feasible corporate reorganizations is merely to give the
court power to do work that needs to be done. This appears to be the true
rationale behind the line of cases we have been considering. A bankruptcy
court deals with a dead thing: a reorganization court is a doctor, called in while
the patient is still breathing and capable, in many cases, of being put back on
his feet. To say that a reorganization court can, as a court of equity, give all the
relief necessary in a single proceeding is not enough. Of course it can give
relief if it has jurisdiction to do so; the problem was to give it the jurisdiction.
This Section 77 and Chapter X have done,25 and attempts to show that juris-
diction of today's extent existed before Section 77 will prove fruitless. That
23. Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91 (1917).
24. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8. The clause has been held to authorize Congress "'to estab-
lish uniform laws on the subject of any person's general inability to pay his debts. . . .
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S.
648, 670 (1935), and cases cited. Hence it covers the concept of "equity" insolvency (in-
ability to pay debts as they mature) as well as that of "bankruptcy" insolvency (excess
of liabilities over assets).
25. In Manhattan Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 171 F. 2d 482 (C. A. 2d
1948), Learned Hand, J., reads the Continental Illinois case in terms of the exercise of the
reorganization power, specifically distinguishing that power from the power of the ordinary
bankruptcy court.
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